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NOTES
CLASS SUITS
Class suits were developed in English equity out of the liberal tradition of following the procedure that would most easily arrive at
justice.' Originally it was required in chancery, as at law, that all
2
interested parties be joined before a controversy could be litigated.
The class suit made it possible to litigate a suit when it was impossible
or impracticable to get all the interested parties before the court. 3 The
interested persons appearing before the court were said to represent
the absent parties, and the absent parties were in effect treated as
though they were before the court.4
The class action was allowed when (1) joinder of all the interested
parties was impossible because they were not subject to the court's
jurisdiction;5 (2) joinder of all the interested parties was impossible
because of the death of one of them;8 or (3)the number of interested
persons was so great that joinder was impracticable.7 A good example
of the English equity practice is Cockburn v. Thompson.8 Several
members of an unincorporated association brought a bill against
Thompson, solicitor for the association. The defendant argued that
all five thousand owners had to be made parties, but the court held
that this was a valid class suit, because the parties were so numerous
that it would be impracticable to require service on them all.
Although the suit was originally evolved from the necessity of
avoiding the compulsory joinder rule, it is now often used in cases in
which joinder is not required.9 Florida Civil Procedure Rule 3.6,
which is derived from Florida Equity Rule 14 and is identical with
old Federal Equity Rule 38 and the rule in other jurisdictions,o states:
"When the question is one of common or general interest
'See Cockburn v. Thompson, 16 Ves. Jr. 321, 33 Eng. Rep. 1005 (1809).
21bid.

3Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41 (1940) (dictum).
4Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288 (1853).

5Hansberry v. Lee, supra note 3; Cockburn v. Thompson, 16 Ves. Jr. 321, 33 Eng.
Rep. 1005 (1809).
albid.

7Bromley v. Williams, 32 Beav. 177, 55 Eng. Rep. 69 (1863); Cockburn v. Thompson, supra note 5.

816 Ves. Jr. 321, 33 Eng. Rep. 1005 (1809).
9E.g., State Road Dep't v. Bender, 147 Fla. 15, 2 So.2d 298 (1941); Skinner v.
Mitchell, 108 Kan. 861, 197 Pac. 569 (1921).
20E.g., CONN. GEN.STAT.

§7827 (1949).
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to many persons constituting a class so numerous as to make
it impracticable to bring them all before the Court, one or more
may sue or defend for the whole."
COMMON OR GENERAL INTEREST

True Class Suit
Some courts" limit the class suit to situations in which compulsory
joinder is required - those in which the class has a joint or common
right or obligation. 12 This is the so-called true class suit." An
example of the true class suit in Florida is Meier v. Johnston.4 Plaintiff brought the suit as representative of all the members of an unincorporated union- to foreclose a mortgage. Since this suit would
litigate an interest common to each member, joinder of all the members would be required unless a class suit were allowed. The Court
pointed out that the members were so numerous as to make joinder
impracticable and therefore the class suit was justified.
Spurious Class Suit
Must a question of "common or general interest" be one requiring
compulsory joinder, or may it merely be a common question of law
or fact? A class suit based on the latter question is a "spurious" class
suit. 5 The rights or obligations of the parties are several, but there
is a common question of law or fact or both.16
In State Road Department v. Bender," plaintiff brought a class
"'See Spear v. H. V. Greene Co., 246 Mass. 259, 140 N.E. 795 (1928); Linden Land
Co. v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co., 107 Wis. 493, 83 N.W. 851 (1900).
"2E.g., Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Langer, 168 F.2d 182 (8th Cir. 1948); accord,
Central Mexico Light & Power Co. v. Munch, 116 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1940); see 8
MooRE, FEDERAL PRACrTicE §23.08 (2d ed. 1948).
"3See 8 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACrCE §28.08 (2d ed. 1948).
14110 Fla. 374, 149 So. 185 (1988).
"1An example is a common disaster situation. A railroad negligently starts a fire

that spreads to the adjoining property of several landowners. Each landowner has a
separate and distinct right against the railroad; in a suit by one owner, joinder of
the others will not be required. See 3 Mooax, FEDERAL PRAcrxcE §28.10 (2d ed.
1948).
l6See FED. R. Civ. P. 28 (a) (8). For a discussion see 8 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcricE
§23.10 (2d ed. 1948).

'7147 Fla. 15, 2 So.2d 298 (1941).
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suit for all the property owners adjoining Bayshore Highway in Hillsborough County to recover damages for the appropriation of land by
the State Road Department in widening the highway. The Road Department had injured the land of each property owner, and each had
a separate right of action against the Department. Hence, there was
no joint interest among the property owners, since their relief was
made up of separate awards of money damages; the common interest in
the case was the common question of law and fact. The necessity
for a representative suit was urged as ground for equitable jurisdiction. The equity court accepted jurisdiction and awarded the relief
sought. The Florida Supreme Court upheld the lower court's position
without comment on the fact that the sole common interest was one
of law and fact.
The Florida Court allowed the class suit in several other instances
in which the rights were separate. In Allen v. Avondale Company,18
plaintiff brought a class suit to cancel restrictive covenants placed in
the deeds of sale of the lots of Avondale subdivision. The covenants
limited the use of the land to residential purposes only, and the covenant was a distinct obligation of each purchaser of a lot. The Court
denied plaintiff the relief but held it to be a valid class suit. The Court
stated: "The question raised is one common to many owners of a
similar class who are so numerous that it would be futile to attempt
to bring them all before the Court."'19
In Miami Beach v. Tenney20 the Court allowed a class suit by several property owners to enjoin the collection of an invalid special
assessment by the city. The Court found that the question was one of
common interest to all the property owners and therefore a proper
class suit. The rights of each property owner, however, were separate.
Each had a right to attack the assessment placed on his property, and
the common question involved was one of law and fact.
The Court in Town of Davenport v. Hughes2l allowed a class suit
by one property owner for all the property owners to enjoin the collection of taxes for city bonds. Plaintiff argued that these lands were
outside the city and could not be taxed for municipal purposes. The
Court held that the lands could not be taxed. It further held that the
suit was a valid representative suit as to all the property owners and a
28135

Fla. 6, 185 So. 137 (1938).

'old.at 9, 185 So. at 138.
20150 Fla. 241, 7 So.2d 136 (1942).
21147 Fla. 228, 2 So.2d 851, cert. denied, 314 U.S. 681 (1941).
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class suit against all the municipal bondholders. The Court stated
that, although the rights were separate, they were governed by the same
legal principle and involved similar facts. Therefore, it allowed the
suit as a representative suit because of common questions of law and
fact.
In spite of the authority of these earlier cases, the Court has refused to allow the class suit in several recent cases 22 in which the only
common question was one of law and fact. In Lakeland v. Chase National Co. 23 the Court refused a class suit on behalf of absent plaintiffs
or against absent defendants. Plaintiff brought the suit for all property owners to vacate a final decree to foreclose tax and special improvement liens. The City of Lakeland and the special master who handled
the foreclosure suit sought to represent all the defendants who had
secured an interest in the lands as a result of the in rem foreclosure
proceedings. The lower court vacated the foreclosure decree as a fraud
on the rights of the landowners. It further held that the suit was a class
suit as to all of the absent plaintiffs and against all of the absent defendants and that judgment was binding as to both. The Supreme
Court upheld the annulment of the foreclosure decree but reversed
as to the representative suit. The Court recognized the case as one
in which joinder was not required and questioned the desirability of
litigating the absent parties' rights in the suit.
In Arsdall v. Winter Haven24 the Court upheld the lower court,
which had denied the suit as a class suit. The facts of the case were
similar to the Town of Davenport case, in which a class suit was allowed. Plaintiff asserted that the lands had been excluded from the
municipality by quo warranto proceedings and sought a decree declaring invalid special improvement liens placed on the land owned by
members of the class. The lower court denied the class suit. The Supreme Court upheld the lower court on the authority of the Lakeland
case.
The recent cases, although not clear, have cast some doubt on
whether the Court will allow a class suit solely on the basis of a common question of law or fact. The Court should settle this question by
a definitive pronouncement when properly presented.
22Osceola Groves, Inc. v. Wiley, 78 So.2d 700 (Fla. 1955); Arsdall v. Winter Haven,
160 Fla. 881, 37 So.2d 164 (1948); Lakeland v. Chase Nat'l Co., 159 Fla. 783, 32 So.2d
833 (1947).
23159 Fla. 783, 32 So.2d 833 (1947).
24160 Fla. 881, 37 So.2d 164 (1948).
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NUMEROUS PARTIEs

The Florida Rule states that there must be a common or general
interest to so many persons that it is impracticable to join them. In
early equity there was no requirement of numerous parties; the class
suit was used as a device to avoid the abatement of an action because
of the death or absence of a party from the jurisdiction. 25 The statutes
of some other states26 allow class suits when the parties either (1)
have a common or general interest or (2) are so numerous that it is
impracticable to join them.
In a situation in which compulsory joinder was required the Florida
Court has allowed a class suit when all the parties could not be brought
before the court, 27 even though the parties were not numerous. When
the suit is in the permissive joinder area, however, the requirement
of numerous parties is the sole basis of the suit. The primary reasons
for the allowance of a class suit in this situation are the convenience
of the parties before the court and the prevention of a multiplicity
of suits. 28 In earlier cases29 the Florida Court allowed class suits without stressing the size of the class. In a more recent case, 30 however,
the Court more strictly construed the requirement of numerous
parties; in denying a class suit, the Court stated that "impracticable"
does not mean "convenient." The requirement of numerous parties
is sound; the convenience of preventing a multiplicity of suits should
not outweigh the importance of having before the court a person
whose rights are being litigated.
RES

JUDICATA AS TO MEMBERS OF THE CLASS

It is a general principle that one is not bound by a judgment in
personam by litigation to which he is not a party.-' A judgment
against the person or property of an absent party does not meet the
requirements of due process as required by the Fifth and Fourteenth
2sHansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41 (1940) (dictum).
20E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §1-70 (1953); S.C. CODE: ANN. §10-205 (1952).
27flocker v. Blocker, 103 Fla. 285, 137 So. 249 (1931).
2sMiami Beach v. Tenney, 150 Fla. 241, 257, 7 So.2d 136, 142 (1942) (dictum);
cf. Spear v. H. V. Greene Co., 246 Mass. 259, 140 N.E. 795 (1923).
2SSee, e.g., Town of Davenport v. Hughes, 147 Fla. 228, 2 So.2d 851, cert. denied,
314 U.S. 681 (1941); State Road Dep't v. Bender, 147 Fla. 15, 2 So.2d 298 (1941).
soLakeland v. Chase Natl Co., 159 Fla. 783, 32 So.2d 833 (1947).
s'Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
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Amendments. 32 The true class suit, however, is an exception to this
rule; a judgment is binding on the absent members of the class33
whether the representatives are plaintiffs 34 or defendants. 35 A state
court's determination that a suit is a valid class suit and binding
on the absent members of the class is not condusive;3 6 if a suit fails
to meet the requirements of a class suit, the United States Supreme
37
Court will reverse as a denial of due process.
The federal courts hold a judgment binding on absent members
of a class when the case is in the compulsory joinder area. 38 Absent
parties to a spurious class suit, however, are not bound by the judgment.3 9 State courts have generally held that a judgment in a class
suit is binding on the absent members of the class whether they are
necessary to the continuation of the suit, or whether the suit is in
the permissive joinder area. 40 A minority of state courts have held
1
that a judgment cannot bind a person not required to be a party."
The Florida Court follows the general rule that a judgment rendered
in a class suit is binding on the absent persons regardless of whether the
42
persons are necessarily or permissively joined.
The United States Supreme Court in Hansberry v. Lee' 3 cast a
strong doubt as to the constitutionality of a judgment binding absent
members when the suit is in the permissive joinder area. The case
involved an agreement by some 500 property owners that none of the
property should be leased or sold to anyone of the Negro race; it provided that the agreement should not be in force unless ninety-five per
44
cent of the property owners had signed it. In an earlier class suit
321bid.

33Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921).
341bid.
35Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288 (1853).
36Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
37Ibid.
38E.g., Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921);
Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288 (1853).
39Wabash R.R. v. Adelbert College, 208 U.S. 38 (1908).
40E.g., Skinner v. Mitchell, 108 Kan. 861, 197 Pac. 569 (1921); Hopkins
193 Ky. 281, 235 S.W. 754 (1921); see Jellen v. O'Brien, 89 Cal. App. 505,
1115 (1928).
4"Linden Land Co. v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co., 107 Wis. 493,
851 (1900); see Kvello v. Lisbon, 38 N.D. 71, 164 N.W. 305 (1917).
42Tenney v. Miami Beach, 152 Fla. 126, 11 So.2d 188 (1942); Dunscombe
139 Fla. 497, 190 So. 796 (1939).
43311 U.S. 32 (1940).
4"Burke v. Kleiman, 277 Ill. App. 519 (1934).
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by the property owners to enforce the same agreements against a white
owner and a Negro tenant the parties had stipulated that ninety-five
per cent of the owners had signed; the judge had made a finding of
this and held the agreement valid and binding.
The plaintiff in the Hansberry case sought to have the agreement
enforced as to the defendants. The defendants argued that ninetyfive per cent of the owners had not signed, and the lower court found
as a fact that only fifty-four per cent had signed. The lower court,
however, found that the former action was a valid class suit and res
judicata, and it enforced the covenant. The Illinois Supreme Court
affirmed the lower court's judgment, though there was a strong dissent
on the ground that the former suit was not a valid class suit.45 The
dissenters argued that the judgment was secured by fraud, that the
class suit is a dangerous exception to the general rule that a party
should have his day in court, and that such a suit should be allowed
only when there is a joint interest, that is, in the compulsory joinder
area.
The United States Supreme Court, in reversing, adopted the dissenting opinion to some extent. It distinguished between class suits
in the compulsory joinder area and those in the permissive joinder
area. The Court stated that in the former a judgment is binding and
46
within due process:
"It is one thing to say that some members of a class may
represent other members in a litigation where the sole and common interest of the class in the litigation, is either to assert a
common right or to challenge an asserted obligation. ...
It is quite another to hold that all those who are free alternatively either to assert rights or to challenge them are of a single
class, so that any group, merely because it is of the class so constituted, may be deemed adequately to represent any others of
the class in litigating their interests in either alternative. Such
a selection of representatives for purposes of litigation, whose
substantial interests are not necessarily or even probably the
same as those whom they are deemed to represent, does not
afford that protection to absent parties which due process requires. The doctrine of representation of absent parties in a
class suit has not hitherto been thought to go so far."
45Lee v. Hansberry, 372 IR. 369, 376, 24 N.E.2d 37, 40 (1939).
46Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 44 (1940).
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